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There are large differences in the kind of jobs that people do across the industrial countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD). To illustrate the point, we report in Table 1 the percentage distribution of 
hours of work in three countries with different taxes and social support programs: 
the United States, Japan, and Sweden.1 Hours of work are sorted into three groups 
according to whether or not the output of an industry has close substitutes in home 
production. Sector 1 comprises agriculture, manufacturing, business services, and 
other services of a specialized nature, which are activities that have no counterpart 
in home production, as reported in time use surveys.2 Sector 2 is the health and 
social work sector, which has home counterparts, especially in family care. Sector 3 
consists of all other sectors, which produce less specialized services and have close 
substitutes in home production, such as retailing (a substitute for shopping time) and 
catering (a substitute for cooking time). 
1 Our aggregate is economy-wide hours of work excluding public administration, defense, and education. A 
discussion of the data for all the countries, including social support programs and their differences, is contained in 
the main body of the paper. For more information on social programs see GØsta Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999).
2 In Ngai and Pissarides (2008) we discuss in detail the kind of activities spent in home production and review 
their historical development. The sector allocations that we are adopting here are consistent with that evidence. 
See also John P. Robinson and Geoffrey Godbey (1997) for the United States and Michael C. Burda, Daniel S. 
Hamermesh, and Philippe Weil (2008) for cross-country comparisons.
* Ngai: London School of Economics, Centre for Economic Performance, Houghton Street, London WC2A 
2AE, and Centre for Economic Policy and Research (e-mail: l.ngai@lse.ac.uk); Pissarides: London School of 
Economics, Centre for Economic Performance, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, and Centre for Economic 
Policy and Research (e-mail: c.pissarides@lse.ac.uk). We have benefited from many comments received in seminar 
and conference presentations. Wouter den Haan, Philippe Aghion, and Zvi Hercowitz acted as discussants at three 
of these conferences, and we are grateful for their comments. We thank our research assistants, Eva Vourvachaki, 
Katrin Tin, Urban Sila, and Milan Lisicky, and the Centre for Economic Performance, a designated research center 
of the Economic and Social Research Council at LSE, for financial support. 
† To comment on this article in the online discussion forum, or to view additional materials, visit the article page 
at http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/mac.3.4.1.
Taxes, Social Subsidies, and the Allocation of Work Time†
By L. Rachel Ngai and Christopher A. Pissarides*
We examine the allocation of hours of work across industrial sec-
tors in OECD countries. We find large disparities across three sec-
tor groups, one that produces goods without home substitutes, and 
two others that have home substitutes but are treated differently by 
welfare policy. We attribute the disparities to the countries’ tax and 
subsidy policies. High taxation substantially reduces hours in sec-
tors that have close home substitutes but less so in other sectors. 
Subsidies increase hours in the subsidized sectors that have home 
substitutes. We compute these policy effects for 19 OECD countries. (JEL H24, H31, J22)
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The share of sector 1 is very similar across the three countries, taking up about 
63 percent of market work. In contrast, there are large differences in the shares of 
the other two sectors. Sweden has a relatively larger health and social work sector, 
whereas Japan has the largest share in sector 3, exceeding the Swedish share of this 
sector by 10 percentage points. Why these large differences in the allocation of work 
time?
We argue that the key reason for these large differences is policy associated with 
the welfare state. Taxes and subsidies influence allocations along two dimensions. 
Consumers switch from taxed goods to subsidized ones and from buying services 
in the market to self-help at home. We compute tax and subsidy rates for 19 OECD 
countries for each one of the three sectors in Table 1, and show that all countries 
subsidize health and social work, but Sweden and other Scandinavian countries 
subsidize them much more than other countries do. The tax differentials between 
social work on the one hand, and all other economic activity on the other hand, vary 
a lot across countries, and this could explain sectoral differences across countries 
through the substitution from other market-produced goods into health and social 
care services.
We calculate how much is this substitution given reasonable elasticity estimates, 
and find that quantitatively it is small. For example, when an accountant’s services 
are taxed and a childminder’s services subsidized, a family may hire an accountant 
for fewer hours and take the child to a child care center, but the elasticity of substitu-
tion between the services of an accountant and the services of a childminder is not 
large enough to support the required quantitative impact. Moreover, since sectors 1 
and 3 are taxed at the same rate and neither is subsidized, cross-market substitutions 
cannot explain why the substitution is mainly from sector 3 into health and social 
work, and not from both of the other sectors.
In order to explain the big quantitative impact of tax subsidy programs and the 
asymmetric response of different sectors, we need the substitution between market 
and home production. When market goods and services are taxed, households turn 
to producing some of those goods in the home, where work is untaxed. Similarly, 
when market-provided social care is subsidized, less of it is done at home and there 
is more take-up of social services in the market. Some market-produced goods have 
close substitutes in home production, and so their response to the tax or subsidy is 
large. Other goods have less good substitutes in home production, implying lower 
response. The differential substitutions between market and home production, when 
combined with the differential tax treatment of social work, drive our results.
Table 1—Percentage Distribution of Hours of Market Work in Three Countries 
(Average, 1994–2003)
Sector United States Japan Sweden
1 63 62 63
2 10  6 17
3 27 31 21
notes: The full definition of sectors is given in Table 3. Sector 1 is mainly manufacturing and 
business services. Sector 2 is health and social work, and sector 3 is mainly unskilled or semi-
skilled services. Government administration and education are excluded.
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We are not the first ones to study the impact of taxes and subsidies and market-
home substitutions on market economic activity. But we believe that we are the 
first to study the impact of different net taxes across sectors and derive the implied 
equilibrium allocation of market work. At the micro level, Richard B. Freeman and 
Ronald Schettkat (2005) study time-use data for a small number of countries and 
conclude that there is virtually one-for-one substitution between home and market 
work across individuals, a claim that was partially supported by Burda, Hamermesh, 
and Weil (2008). Our results require substantial market-home substitutions at the 
micro level, and they are consistent with one-for-one substitutions for some goods. 
Also at the micro level, although emphasizing sectoral differences, Steven J. Davis 
and Magnus Henrekson (2005) study questions similar to ours in a partial equilib-
rium task-assignment model. They estimate the impact of taxation on employment 
in three sectors of economic activity: eating and drinking establishments, lodging, 
and retail trade.3 Their estimation results are consistent with the results of our model.
The macro literature has focused on total hours of work, a topic that we do not 
address. A main motivation for the macro literature is the reconciliation of high 
taxation with high participation in Scandinavian countries, which goes against the 
predictions of Edward C. Prescott’s (2004) influential study. The claim made in the 
more recent literature, consistent with our analysis, is that it is not only taxes that 
matter, but also how the tax revenue is spent. Prescott effectively assumed that all 
tax revenue is returned to the public as a lump sum transfer. Lump sum transfers 
have income effects but no substitution effects, so taxes in his model have their 
maximum impact on hours of work. But if some of the tax revenue is returned as a 
consumption subsidy, the tax distortion is reduced. Richard Rogerson (2007) illus-
trates how the impact of taxes on hours of work in a standard model varies accord-
ing to the assumptions made about the distribution of tax revenue. He argues that 
the Scandinavian “outlier” could potentially be explained by a larger consumption 
subsidy given by Scandinavian countries.
Kelly S. Ragan (2010) goes one step further and calculates the consumption sub-
sidy for purchasing market services related to child care and elderly care. In that 
respect her study is similar to ours. She uses the computed subsidy to calculate its 
impact on the choice between total home and total market work, making use of a 
variant of Sherwin Rosen’s (1997) model. She derives a weaker effect of general 
taxation on total market hours in Scandinavia because of a bigger subsidy in that 
group of countries. We study its impact at the level of a finer sector decomposition. 
Because of the aggregative focus of her work, she applies the consumption subsidy 
to market substitutes of all home production. We disaggregate market substitutes of 
home production into those that are subsidized and those that are not, and compute 
a net tax wedge for each sector.
Total hours of work in Sweden and how they compare with the United States is 
also the focus of Conny Olovsson (2009), who notes that the sum of market and home 
hours in Sweden and the United States is about the same, but market hours in the 
3 They deliberately omit child care because of difficulties in constructing comparable subsidy rates across the 
countries in their sample, one of the challenges that we take up in this paper. Their sample of countries for the 
employment regressions varies between 9 and 14 countries, depending on data availability.
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United States account for a bigger fraction of the total. He calibrates whole econ-
omy models for the two countries and shows that the differences in time allocations 
are explained by the higher taxation of market work in Sweden. Rogerson (2008) is 
another study that emphasizes the distortionary impact of taxes because of the market-
home substitution. He uses his model to derive the change in total hours of work in 
services between 1956 and 2003 in an aggregate of five continental European coun-
tries, and compares the outcome with the United States. He shows that the bulk of the 
difference can be explained by the bigger rise in taxes in Europe over this period.
Because of the important role of the disbursement of tax revenue, the authors 
who studied total hours of work are forced to make some strong assumptions about 
it. For example, like Prescott (2004), Rogerson (2008) assumes that all tax rev-
enue is returned to consumers as a lump sum. Olovsson (2009) explores different 
assumptions, one of which assumes that some tax revenue is used up by the gov-
ernment to finance its own consumption. Moreover, in order to obtain their results, 
these authors also assume that the government balances incomes and revenues every 
period, a strong assumption for cross-country comparisons, where debt and deficit 
levels vary substantially. In contrast, in our study of the allocations across sectors, 
we do not need to make any assumptions about the use of net tax revenue (gross 
taxes net of social subsidies), or the government budget, to obtain our results. We 
consider this to be an important advantage of our work over the studies of whole 
economy hours. Our sample of 19 countries is also a much bigger number than in 
most previous studies, despite the bigger disaggregation that we do.4
The key to our model are two elasticities of substitution: the one between market 
goods and the one between market and home production. We show that general 
taxation has a greater impact on sector 3, services with home substitutes, than on 
sector 1, whose output has no home substitutes, because sector 3 loses more hours 
to the untaxed home sector. But health and social care is subsidized, so market 
hours gain both from the home sector (if the subsidy is large enough to outweigh the 
impact of the income tax) and from the other two nonsubsidized sectors.5
In order to quantify our predictions, we need three different types of data.6 First, we 
need to know the hours of work allocated to different sectors, which are available for a 
fairly large number of countries at the two-digit level through the database productivity 
in the European union: A Comparative industry Approach (EU KLEMS). Second, we 
need the size of social expenditure on benefits in kind, such as day care centers, which 
can be obtained from the OECD Social Expenditure Database (SOCX). Finally, we 
need to know the hours allocated to different activities at home, which we obtain from 
time-use surveys. We constructed  comparable datasets for 19 OECD countries, and 
we focus on cross-country differences around the time of the time-use surveys, circa 
2000. These countries include several European countries from Scandinavia to the 
4 The papers on total hours disaggregate, at best, between all services and manufacturing. A pioneering discus-
sion of the differential impact of policy on the allocation of work in Sweden is contained in Assar Lindbeck (1982). 
See also Lindbeck (1997) for a more detailed discussion of the Swedish welfare state and its role in the economy.
5 Unfortunately, it is not possible to distinguish between high-skill health care, e.g., surgery, and social work, 
such as child care centers or elderly care. Ideally, our sector 2 should exclude high-skill health care that has no 
home substitutes.
6 See the online Appendix for a full listing of data sources and definitions.
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Mediterranean, the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and Korea, 
so we have a good mix of tax and subsidy regimes.
Section I describes our model of three market and two home sectors. We derive 
equilibrium allocations as functions of three sets of parameters, preferences, tech-
nology, and policy. In Section II, we describe the relevant data for the 19 countries in 
our sample and summarize their main features. In Section III, we give the parameter 
values used in the quantitative evaluation of the impact of policy. The quantitative 
evaluation begins with Section IV, where we illustrate the workings of the model 
within the policy parameter range calculated in the data section, and refer back to 
the example of Table 1. Predictions with the full sample are given in Sections V, VI, 
and VII, beginning with cross-market substitutions and following up with substitu-
tions between market and home production.
I. The Model
Consumer Allocations.—We solve the time allocations for a representative agent 
who has a static CES utility function defined over consumption goods produced at 
home and in the market, and over leisure. She is a price and wage taker in the mar-
ket, conditional on taxes and transfers chosen by the government, and chooses home 
production conditional on linear production functions. There is no capital in the 
model, so it can be solved as a static resource allocation problem, with linear pro-
duction functions for market goods as well, and market clearing throughout. There 
are no profits in equilibrium and all income is in the form of wages.
The representative agent’s utility function is
(1) u(c,  l m ,  l h ) = ln c + v (1 −  l m −  l h ),
where c is a consumption aggregate;  l m is market work (private and government); 
and  l h is home work. v(·) is an increasing concave function. Aggregate consumption 
is a CES aggregate of three types of goods, denoted by  ˜  ci ,
(2) c = [  ∑ 
i=1
3
  ω i  ˜  ci  (ε−1) /ε  ] ε/ (ε−1)  ,
where ε ≥ 0 is the constant elasticity of substitution, and  ω i > 0, ∑  ω i = 1. Each  ˜  ci 
is a composite of market-produced and home-produced goods in sector i. Sector 1 is 
comprised of all goods that have no home-produced substitutes, so  ˜  c1 is the market 
good  c 1 . In sectors 2 and 3,  ˜  ci is a CES aggregate of market- and home-produced 
goods,
(3)  ˜  ci = [ ψ i  c i  (σ i −1)/ σ i  + (1 −  ψ i )  c ih ( σ i −1)/ σ i   ]  σ i /( σ i −1)  i = 2, 3,
where  c i is market-produced consumption;  c ih is consumption of goods produced at 
home;  σ i ≥ 0 is the elasticity of substitution between home and market consumption 
for each good i; and  ψ i ∈ (0, 1).
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Government taxes wage income at rate τ and each market good at a net rate  t i (the 
gross tax rate less any subsidy). It also taxes or subsidizes employment at a rate  t e . 
It uses its net revenue from the taxes and subsidies to employ labor, supply goods to 
consumers, or consume other goods. We assume that the product of public adminis-
tration is a public good that is separable from the goods included in the aggregate c. 
We also exclude education services from c because they are not a final consumption 
good but an investment good. The employment used to produce the public good and 
education is part of  l m .
We do include health and social care in c. This is because our focus is on social 
care, which is clearly a consumption good that can be produced both at home and 
in the market. The amount of health services consumed by the representative agent 
is also a matter of consumption decisions, depending on the cost to the individual. 
Health and social care are subsidized by the government, either directly through the 
provision of subsidized care or through transfers. We treat the subsidy as a negative 
tax, with the individual having free choice over the quantity that she consumes at 
the subsidized price.
Governments also make lump sum transfers t to the representative agent. Part of 
the lump sum transfer is a component of social policy, like, for example, transfers to 
families with children. But lump sum transfers also include tax revenue not used to 
subsidize consumption of certain goods or employ labor. We briefly return to this topic 
below.
The disutility from work is independent of sector or location, and there is perfect 
labor mobility. The wage rate is the same in all sectors, so the budget constraint on 
the consumption of market goods is
(4)  ∑ 
i=1
3
 ( 1 +  t i )  p i  c i ≤ (1 − τ) w l m + t.
The consumption of home goods is constrained by the linear production functions
(5)  c jh ≤  A jh  l jh , j = 2, 3,
where  l jh is the time allocated at home to each activity j; and  A jh is labor productivity 
in each activity.
In order to solve the problem, it is convenient to define a new budget constraint 
for total work l ≡  l m +  l h that incorporates the production constraints (5). Define 
“total” after-tax income by (1 − τ)wl, and make use of it and (5) to rewrite (4) as
(6)  ∑ 
i=1
3
 ( 1 +  t i )  p i  c i +  ∑ 
j=2
3
 p jh  c jh ≤ (1 − τ) wl + t,
where pjh ≡ (1 − τ)w/ A jh is a net implicit (producer) price for home-produced 
goods. The numerator is the net wage that the household could get by supplying one 
unit of labor to the market, and the denominator is the number of units of the home 
good that she could get by supplying the same unit to home production.
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The consumer problem is the maximization of (1)–(3) subject to the single con-
straint (6). From the optimality conditions, we derive some key results.
total Work Hours.—The first-order maximization conditions yield the following 
result for total hours of work, l:
(7)  1 _ 
 v′ (1 − l)  − l =  t _  (1 − τ) w .
In the absence of lump sum transfers, total work depends only on preference 
parameters because of the logarithmic utility of aggregate consumption. The sup-
ply of hours to the market then varies only to the extent that there are substitu-
tions between home and market production (which we call, following Freeman and 
Schettkat (2005), “marketization” ). In Ngai and Pissarides (2008), we showed that 
such substitutions can give nontrivial labor supply dynamics, driven by the dynam-
ics of technology. But if there are implicit or explicit lump sum transfers, both 
the dynamics and cross-sectional properties of the supply of labor become richer, 
because now there are two substitution margins, the one for overall leisure and mar-
ketization. In general, the bigger the lump sum transfer, the stronger the impact of 
taxation on market work.
Cross-country studies of differences in total hours make use of an equation like 
(7) to derive their quantitative conclusions. The usual approach, however, is not 
to compute t directly, but to assume that the government balances its budget with 
an appropriate choice of t and no borrowing. t is then substituted out of (7) from 
the budget constraint, leaving only taxes in it (see e.g., Prescott 2004; Rogerson 
2008; and Ragan 2010). This implicitly treats all tax revenue (in Ragan’s case net 
of social subsidies) as a lump sum transfer. Government consumption that is not a 
close substitute for private consumption and the government’s administrative wage 
bill, which is paid conditional on market work, is not accounted for in these studies. 
This omission, and the assumption that the budget is balanced across countries in 
the year of the study, casts doubts on this approach to the treatment of the lump sum 
transfer. In this paper, we do not address the question of the impact of taxation on 
the total number of hours of work, and, as we show next, this gets rid of the lump 
sum transfer from our equations, obviating the need to make assumptions about its 
measurement.
Market Shares.—We make predictions about the allocation of market work by 
computing the market share of each sector, defined by  s j = 100 l j / ∑ i=1 3  l i . Given the 
structure of the model, it is convenient to derive these predictions from the model’s 
predictions of the ratios  l 2 / l 1 and  l 3 / l 1 by rewriting the shares as
(8)  s j = 100   l j / l 1  _ 
 ∑ i=1 3  l i / l 1 
  j = 1, 2, 3.
To make these predictions, we therefore need to derive expressions for just two 
ratios of hours of work,  l 2 / l 1 and  l 3 / l 1 . We do this in three steps.
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Marketization.—The composite good  ˜  cj can be acquired by buying some  c j from 
the market at price (1 +  t j )pj, or by producing it at home as  c jh at a (shadow) unit cost 
pjh. We define “marketization” as the substitution of one unit of  c j for  c jh . The extent 
of marketization is obtained by setting the marginal rate of substitution across goods 
c j and  c jh equal to their relative prices:
(9)   c j  _  c jh  = (  ψ j  _ 1 −  ψ j    p jh  _  (1 +  t j ) pj )  σ j  j = 2, 3.
Recalling that pjh = (1 − τ)w/ A jh , it follows that consumers marketize more of 
good j if they have higher net wages, if the market good is cheaper, or if labor pro-
ductivity in home production is lower. The impact of these parameters depends on 
the elasticity of substitution between market and home goods. In the limit, as  σ j → 0, 
the two types of goods are consumed in fixed proportions. But, for  σ j > 0, there can 
be a lot of differences in the marketization of home production across individuals, 
countries, or over time, depending on the values taken by taxes and market prices.
relative Demand for Market goods.—We next solve for the ratio of real demand 
for market goods 2 and 3, which have home substitutes, to the demand for good 1. 
The objective is to obtain from these ratios the employment shares in each sector of 
market activity. Setting the marginal rate of substitution across good j and good 1 
equal to their relative price, we obtain
(10)   c j  _  c 1 = (  ω j  ψ j  _ ω 1   ) ε ( (1 +  t j )pj _(1 +  t 1 ) p 1   ) −ε (  c j  _  ˜  cj ) 1−ε/ σ j  .
We note that  c j / ˜  cj is the share of good j that is marketized. It follows that the rela-
tive market demand for good j is a decreasing function of its relative consumer price 
and, under the plausible restriction ε ≤  σ j , an increasing function of the degree of 
its marketization. Marketization is an important channel through which policy influ-
ences relative market shares. Higher and uniform taxes on all goods (i.e.,  t j =  t 1 ) do 
not affect relative consumption shares for given marketization, but they imply less 
marketization for good j, and so a lower market share for this good, relative to the 
market share of good 1.
the Sectoral Allocation of time.—In order to derive the market employment 
shares, we make use of market clearing and the production functions for each mar-
ket good. Let the production functions be
(11)  c i ≤  A i  l i , i = 1, 2, 3.
The notation parallels that for home production, with  A i standing for the (market) 
labor productivity of good i and  l i for the number of hours allocated to it.
The net revenue to the firm from the sale of good i is  p i  A i  l i , and is used to pay for 
wages and employment taxes net of subsidies. Free mobility of labor implies that wages 
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are the same in all market sectors, so if employment taxes are also the same across sec-
tors, relative producer prices are given by the ratio of the technology parameters:
(12) (1 +  t e ) w  l i =  p i   A i  l i ⇒   p i  _ pj =  
 A j 
 _
 A i 
 ,  i, j = 1, 2, 3.
The relative price of the market good to the implicit price of the home good is 
also obtained from (12), by substituting w from it into the condition pjh = (1 − τ) × w/ A jh . This substitution yields
(13)  (1 +  t j )pj _pjh  =  
(1 +  t j )(1 +  t e )  A jh 
  __ (1 − τ) A j   .
We define the “tax wedge” that applies to sector j, denoted  t wj , by
7
(14)  t wj = 1 −  1 − τ__ (1 +  t j )(1 +  t e )  .
With the linear production functions and the relative prices just obtained, the mar-
ketization condition (9) translates into the following condition for the marketization 
of time in sector j : 
(15)   l j  _ 
 l jh 
 = ( 1 _  ψ j  − 1 ) − σ j  (  A j  _  A jh  )  σ j −1 (1 −  t wj )  σ j   j = 2, 3.
The marketization of time is driven by three sets of parameters: preferences, produc-
tivity, and taxes. For  σ j > 1, more is marketized when market productivity is higher 
than home productivity.8 More importantly for our present objectives, the impact 
of policy is summarized in a single composite, the tax wedge. A higher tax wedge 
leads to less marketization, and the impact is bigger when the elasticity  σ j is bigger.
Turning now to market sectors, we derive the employment ratios of sectors from 
(10) and the linear production functions
(16)   l j  _ 
 l 1 
= (  ω j  ψ j  _ ω 1   )ε (  A 1  _ A j  )1−ε ( 1 +  t j  _1 +  t 1  )−ε (  c j  _  ˜  cj ) 1−ε/ σ j  .
Calculating  c j / ˜  cj from (3), (9), and (13), we obtain
(17)   c j  _ 
 ˜  cj 
=  ψ j − σ j /( σ j  −1) [1 + ( 1 _  ψ j  − 1 )  σ j  (  A jh  _  A j (1 −  t wj ) )  σ j  −1  ] − σ j /( σ j  −1) .
7 For small tax rates this is approximately equal to the tax wedge used in econometric studies,  t wj = τ +  t j +  t e , 
but taxes in our sample of countries are not small, and the approximation is not good.
8 To see the intuition, suppose the goods are perfect substitutes, then  σ j → ∞ and all production moves to 
the more productive location. If  σ j = 0, the same quantity of each good needs to be produced and consumed, and 
so more labor is employed in the less productive location to compensate for the higher productivity in the other 
location.
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Equation (16) is a key equation for the model because it gives the dependence of the 
allocation of time on policy.
Policy influences employment shares in two ways. First, for given marketization 
of consumption, policy influences market shares because of nonuniform taxation 
associated with social subsidies. If  t j <  t 1 , as would be the case if sector j is subsi-
dized and sector 1 is not, the relative employment of sector j for given marketization 
is higher, because of a switch of demand from the taxed sector to the subsidized 
one. The extent of this switch depends on the elasticity of substitution across market 
goods, ε.
Second, policy influences the relative size of sectors because of the substitutions 
between home and market production. In a general equilibrium, there is a switch of 
hours of work from the taxed market sector to the untaxed home sector that produces 
close substitutes. This distortion works even if two sectors are equally taxed ( t j =  t 1 ), 
because sectors with closer home substitutes suffer bigger losses of demand and 
employment than sectors with less good home substitutes. From (16), it is clear that 
the condition for this intuition to go through is ε/ σ j < 1; that is, that the elasticity 
of substitution between home and market goods should be bigger than the elasticity 
of substitution across market goods.
The model makes strong predictions about two features of sectoral allocations 
that can be confronted with data. First, the relative employment shares in (16) 
depend on expenditure tax differentials and on market-home substitutions. Second, 
the marketization in (15) depends on the tax wedge applying to the sector. We now 
discuss the data needed to quantify these two predictions.
II. Data Derivation and Description
Time-use surveys have proliferated recently, but with very minor exceptions they 
are still mainly one-off surveys that follow similar principles across countries and 
over time. The United States began an annual survey in 2003, and the European 
Union is in the process of setting up Europe-wide standards for regular surveys 
across the European Union. However, for the purposes of this study, we are restricted 
to a small number of surveys. We selected one survey for as many countries of the 
OECD as we could find, undertaken as close to the turn of the millennium as pos-
sible. For most countries, this was the only available information. We used time-use 
surveys to extract time spent in home production in sectors 2 and 3 of the model, as 
detailed below.
Time-use surveys, however, despite very detailed reporting of the kind of activi-
ties done away from the market, do not report the industrial breakdown of market 
hours. The source of the industrial breakdown of hours of work that is comparable 
across countries is the EU KLEMS database, which is employer-based. We use this 
survey to get the percentage distribution of total market hours across the model’s 
three sectors and the absolute number of hours in sectors 2 and 3. The absolute 
number of hours in each sector is needed only in the marketization equations of 
these two sectors.
We grouped the EU KLEMS two-digit sectors into the model’s three sectors 
according to the classifications in Table 2. The market activities in the subsectors 
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included in sector 3 broadly correspond to the home-production activities reported 
in time-use surveys, e.g., hours of work in the retail sector correspond to time spent 
shopping in time-use surveys, restaurants match time spent cooking, etc.
For sector 2, all time-use surveys report hours of child care, which is a close sub-
stitute for market-based child care, and most also report a smaller number of hours 
for care of other dependents. We were able to construct for all countries an estimate 
of total care done at home, including child and adult care. The equivalent market 
sector is health and social work, which includes the number of hours worked in child 
care centers, adult homes, and public and private hospitals. Given that time use sur-
veys do not report time allocated to medical care in the home, ideally we would have 
wanted to split the market sector into two: one for health services such as hospital 
treatment, which has no home substitutes; and one for caring services, with home 
substitutes. However, this is not possible with the available datasets, so we treat the 
aggregate of health and social work as the market activity, with child care and adult 
household care as its close home substitute. The overall figure for adult care is small, 
amounting, on average, to 16 percent of total care, so our home production time for 
care is dominated by child care time.
Government employment and education are excluded from the analysis.9 Our 
aggregate economy is made up of the sectors listed in Table 2,  and we study the 
determinants of the distribution of work among the three sectors of this economy.
The average shares of each of our three sectors for the last ten years of the sample 
are shown in Figure 1. The acronyms are the first two letters of the country name 
throughout this paper. Sector 1 is the biggest sector in all countries, but the most inter-
esting fact that emerges from this figure is that despite its size, the  cross-sectional 
variation in the share of sector 1 is less than that in the other two sectors. We show 
below that this is a key prediction of our model.
The largest shares of sector 2 hours are in the four Scandinavian countries, and the 
smallest in the two Mediterranean and two Asian countries covered by the  sample. 
9 One could argue that medical treatment should be excluded too, as it has many common features with educa-
tion (government support, investment in human capital, etc.). But this is not possible with the data at our disposal.
Table 2—The Three Sectors of Market Work
Production and business services Health Other services
Agriculture and allied Wholesale trade Health and social work Sale, motor repairs retail 
trade
Mining and quarrying Air transport, post, and 
telecom
Hotels and restaurants
Manufacturing Finance, insurance, real 
estate, and business 
services
Inland transport, water 
transport, auxiliary transport
Gas, electricity, water Membership organizations, 
media activities
Refuse disposal recreational, 
other personal
notes: All economic sectors in EU KLEMS are included except for public administration, defense and compulsory 
social security (L), and education (M). The very small sector private households with employed persons (P) is also 
excluded from the analysis because of apparent inconsistencies in the data.
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Although naturally no country is exactly the same as another in its treatment of 
welfare, there are country clusters with broadly similar policies that correspond to 
the rankings in Figure 1 (see Esping-Andersen 1990, 1999).10 The Scandinavian 
countries have the highest levels of overall taxation, but they use a large part of the 
revenue to subsidize market-based social services. They have the largest sector 2 
share. Next come the continental European countries, which also have high taxation 
and heavily subsidize social services, but not to the extent of the Scandinavian coun-
tries. Anglo-Saxon countries have generally lower taxation and welfare transfers, 
so they have relatively larger sectors 1 and 3, and correspondingly a smaller sector 
2 share. Finally, southern European countries do not give support to market-based 
social care and have the smallest relative size for sector 2. Japan and Korea are in 
line with southern European countries with no subsidy to market-based social care.
Policy is characterized by three types of instruments: taxes, health and social 
care subsidies, and lump sum transfers. Lump sum transfers are not relevant for our 
analysis, but the other two instruments are. The tax rates on labor income, consumer 
spending, and employment can be calculated from national accounts data given in 
OECD publications (see the online Appendix). For each country, we also calculated 
the employment subsidy rate as the ratio of total spending on “active employment 
measures” to the wage bill. The combination of these taxes net of the employment 
subsidy gives the tax wedge for sectors 1 and 3.
For the health and social work sector, different countries follow different subsidi-
zation policies, and detailed case-by-case modeling for each country is not feasible. 
We follow a common approach to defining the subsidy rate, which captures the 
extent of subsidization of this sector. We calculated two alternative subsidy rates: 
one applying to social care only and one including health subsidies.
10 The distribution of employment is close to the distribution of hours of work and results would not differ if we 
worked with employment shares. The correlation coefficients between the hours share and the employment share 
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Figure 1. Percentage Distribution of Hours of Work, 1994–2003, Sorted According to 
Sector 2 Size
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The main substitution between market and home is in social care. Our first sub-
sidy measure includes the value of “benefits in kind” in social care, reported in 
SOCX, which is mainly the money governments spent on subsidizing day care cen-
ters for preschool children and homes for older people. The second subsidy adds to 
this health spending on benefits in kind. Health spending is, on average, much larger 
than social care spending, but it encompasses both medical services and drugs and 
medical equipment, which are not part of the output of the health sector. Health 
expenditure data for the United States shows that about half the health spending is 
on drugs and equipment and the other half is on medical services.11 We applied this 
fraction to all countries, and so divided by two the total health subsidy reported in 
SOCX. Adding the result to social care spending yields our second health and social 
care subsidy.
The subsidy rate on health and social care is defined as the ratio of each subsidy 
amount calculated as in the preceding paragraph, to the gross output of the health 
and social work sector. As the value added of private health and social care services 
is not taxed, the subsidy rate calculated for each country is the net expenditure tax on 
the model’s sector 2, which is a negative number in all countries. The simple corre-
lation coefficient between the two calculated subsidy rates is 0.87, so countries that 
heavily subsidize social care also subsidize health more generously, and countries 
that do not heavily subsidize social care do not subsidize health as generously. Our 
results are very similar for the two rates, and for space reasons the detailed results 
that we report are for the narrower definition only, mentioning only briefly some 
results for the broader measure. We prefer the narrower definition because the main 
market-home substitution is in social care, and this rate includes only items that are 
directly measured.
Figure 2 shows the calculated tax wedge for health and social work, based on 
the narrower subsidy that excludes health, and the tax wedge for the rest of the 
economy. Countries are sorted according to the differential between the two rates. 
As expected, the Scandinavian countries have the biggest differential between the 
two tax rates and the south European and North American countries have the small-
est. A striking feature of the data shown in Figure 2 is the cross-country variation in 
the two rates. There is much more variation in social subsidies than in total taxes; 
the total tax wedge ranges from nearly 50 percent in Sweden to 27 percent in Korea, 
in contrast to the tax wedge for health and social work, which ranges from − 40 per-
cent in Norway to + 26 percent in Italy.12 The correlation coefficient between the 
two tax wedges is equal to − 0.41, picking up the obvious fact that tax rates are 
higher in the countries that give more social care subsidies.13
11 The Consumption Expenditure Survey (CEX) of the United States for 2003 gives the following expenditure 
breakdowns for healthcare: 3.1 percent on health insurance, 1.4 percent on medical services, 1.1 percent on drugs, 
and 0.3 percent on medical supplies. Excluding insurance, the spending on medical services is 50 percent of total 
health spending. Insurance spending can be assumed to be in the same proportions as private spending.
12 In all countries, the health and social care wedge is made up of a negative expenditure tax (the social care 
subsidy) and two positive taxes (the income tax and the employment tax). Depending on their relative size, the 
outcome could be either positive or negative.
13 Recently, Lee Ohanian, Andrea Raffo, and Rogerson (2008) used a different method from ours to construct 
a whole-economy tax wedge for a subsample of the OECD countries in our sample. The correlation coefficient 
between our tax wedge for sectors 1 and 3 and theirs is 0.88. The only apparent difference in the rank comparisons 
is that their method makes Spain and Australia lower tax countries than our methods do.
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III. Parameter Values
The key equations used in the predictions of the market shares are (15), (16), and 
(17). Equation (16) shows that the impact of the parameters on the ratio of hours can 
be divided into the impact of the substitution across the three market goods and the 
impact of the substitution between market and home production. However, because 
the expenditure taxes in sectors 1 and 3 are the same, the relative size of sector 3 to 
sector 1 is unaffected by the cross-market substitution.
We study the impact of policy on market shares by investigating each substitution 
channel separately—across market goods due to the ε elasticity, for given home pro-
duction time, and between market and home due to the  σ j elasticity. The elasticity 
values that we used in the computations were chosen as follows.
Beginning with  σ j , we have estimates in the literature of the elasticity of substitu-
tion between all of home production and all market goods. These estimates are in 
the range 1.5–2.3. 14 In our model,  σ j is the elasticity of substitution between market 
and home goods in two subsectors of the economy, where there might be differ-
ent substitution possibilities. Sector 3, however, includes virtually all the services 
that drive the aggregate elasticity of substitution (except for family care). With this 
selection of services, we would expect the substitution possibilities between sector 3 
and home production to be stronger than for the economy as a whole. In view of this, 
a value in the upper range of the aggregate estimates is more appropriate. We choose 
σ 3 = 2.3 as our benchmark, although even higher values might be appropriate.15 For 
the health and social work sector, the substitution elasticity is likely to depend on 
the breakdown of the sector between the health and social work components, and on 
family views about the closeness of market-provided child care to family-provided 
14 See Peter Rupert, Rogerson, and Randall Wright (1995); Ellen R. McGrattan, Rogerson, and Wright (1997); 
and Yongsung Chang and Frank Schorfheide (2003).
15 Rogerson (2008) aggregates all services together and uses a “conservative” elasticity 1.8. His service aggre-
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Figure 2. The Calculated Tax Wedge, 1994–2003, Sorted According to the Differential 
between the Two Rates (Social subsidies only)
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care. We have no information from direct estimates for either, and we used the same 
value as for sector 3 in our benchmark,  σ 2 = 2.3. We check the robustness of our 
computation results by working out the solutions for a large range of σ, from 1.5 to 
10. Results are reported mainly in the online Appendix, but they generally do not 
differ much from the benchmark ones.
The elasticity ε is the price elasticity of the three consumption aggregates in our 
model. In estimates based on models without home production, this is also the price 
elasticity of demand. But with home production the estimated price elasticity is a 
weighted average of the σ and ε elasticities, with weights that depend on all the param-
eters of the model. On the assumption that σ > ε, in a model with home production, 
the ε elasticity should be less than the estimated overall price elasticity of demand.
Estimates of the price elasticity of demand for service goods or subgroups within 
services are all below 1, and usually in the range 0–0.3.16 More recently, Berthold 
Herrendorf, Rogerson, and Ákos Valentinyi (2009), addressing this issue with 
consumption expenditure data for the United States for 1947–2007, show that the 
expenditure estimate of the elasticity of substitution across agriculture, manufac-
turing, and service goods is around 0.8. But since our production functions are for 
value added, a more appropriate elasticity is the one derived for the value-added 
components for each sector. For this estimate they derive an elasticity close to 0.
Given that the ε of our model should be less than the estimated demand elasticities 
in econometric studies because of the home production component, and it should be 
closer to the value-added estimate of Herrendorf, Rogerson, and Valentinyi (2009), 
the upper value estimate of 0.3 of the econometric studies is an upper bound for this 
elasticity, with 0 a lower bound.
IV. A Quantitative Example
We begin our quantitative applications by illustrating the interaction between the 
cross-market and market-home substitutions that drive our results, with reference to 
the example discussed in the introduction and summarized in Table 1. The purpose 
of the example is to derive the impact on the distribution of work of uniform taxa-
tion, social care subsidies, and different values of the elasticities of substitution. We 
assume that all countries in the sample have the same parameter values, except for 
their tax and subsidy rates. In light of this, the only parameters needed to get predic-
tions, except for the policy parameters, are the two elasticities, σ and ε.
There are four tax rates that have an impact on allocations: the expenditure taxes 
t 1 and  t 2 , and the tax wedges  t w1 and  t w2 . Sector 3 has the same tax rates as sector 1. 
Table 3 shows the sample means for these tax rates and the values that are used in 
the illustration. The latter set are drawn from the rates calculated for Sweden and 
Japan; the extreme countries are shown in Table 1. The column headed “low uniform” 
assumes that the country is a low-tax country (like Japan) but does not subsidize health 
and social care at all. The column headed “high uniform” also assumes that there are 
no social subsidies, but taxes are as high as in Sweden. The other two columns make 
16 See Rodney E. Falvey and Norman Gemmell (1996); Robert Summers (1985); and Richard Blundell, Panos 
Pashardes, and Gugielmo Weber (1993) for micro-econometric estimates.
16 AMEriCAn ECOnOMiC JOurnAL: MACrOECOnOMiCS OCtOBEr 2011
the same assumptions about taxes, but introduce the subsidies observed in Japan and 
Sweden.
Solving the model for the sample means and for ε = 0.3 and  σ 2 =  σ 3 = 2.3, we 
obtain the sector shares shown in the second column of Table 4. When taxation is 
uniform across the three sectors, and is increased from the low Japanese rates to the 
high Swedish rates, the distribution of work shifts from the sectors with home sub-
stitutes, 2 and 3, to the sector without substitutes, 1. The home-market substitution is 
the only driving force behind the changes in the market shares in this case. Sectors 2 
and 3 lose hours in similar proportions, but because sector 3 is the bigger one, most 
of the fall in the percentage share is in this sector. So if, for example, Sweden had the 
same taxes as at present, but did not use part of the revenue to subsidize health and 
social care, its health and social work sector would have occupied only 4.2 percent 
of total market hours, with the bulk of care taking place in the home.
When the subsidies for sector 2 are introduced, in the last two columns of Table 4, 
both other shares fall, approximately by the same proportion, and the share of sector 
2 increases dramatically. The model predictions for Sweden are very close to the data 
shown in Table 1. Sector 1 gains from the high tax at the expense of sectors 2 and 3, 
which have home substitutes, and then sector 2 gains from the subsidy at the expense 
of sectors 1 and 3. Sector 1 share is almost unaffected by the policy because the two 
substitution channels offset each other. But sector 3 share falls dramatically because 
both substitution channels act in the same direction. Japan has low taxation, so it has a 
higher sector 3 share than Sweden, but not as high as it would have had with no taxes at 
all. The model’s predictions for Japan are again very close to the data shown in Table 1.
It is clear from the discussion and from the computations shown in Table 4, that the 
home-market substitution is crucial in explaining the large variations observed in the 
share of sector 3 across the countries in the sample. If we assume that the elasticity 
of substitution between market goods and home goods is zero, we get for Sweden, 
Table 4—Predicted Sector Shares under Alternative Tax Regimes
Sector Sample means Low uniform High uniform Low subsidy High subsidy
1 63.4 61.8 72.8 60.1 64.2
2  9.7  5.9  4.2  8.4 15.5
3 26.9 32.3 23.0 31.5 20.3
Table 3—Alternative Tax Regimes
Tax Sample means Low uniform High uniform Low subsidy High subsidy
 t 1 ,  t 3  0.21  0.13  0.22  0.13  0.22
 t 2  − 0.18  0.13  0.22  − 0.10  − 0.48
 t w1 ,  t w3  0.38  0.28  0.49  0.28  0.49
 t w2  0.07  0.28  0.49  0.10  − 0.22
notes: Low uniform applies a uniform tax to all sectors, with the level set at the sector 1 and 3 value for Japan. High 
uniform does the same but sets the tax rates at the levels for Sweden. The low subsidy column gives the actual rates 
for Japan and the high subsidy column gives the actual rates for Sweden.
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respective shares of the three sectors: 62.2, 10.4, and 27.4. Compared with the results 
in the high-subsidy case in Table 4, we find that the share of sector 1 is less by 2 per-
centage points, but the share of sector 2 is less by 5 points, and that of sector 3 is higher 
by 7 points. The value of ε, the elasticity of substitution across goods, required to bring 
the prediction of health and social work up to the 15.5 percent level of Table 4 is 2.1, 
but at that level (and  σ j = 0 for both j = 2, 3) the share of sector 1 is 55 and the share 
of sector 3 is 30.5, which are far off the data points.
We argued that the estimates of the elasticity of substitution between market and 
home production in the literature give a lower bound on  σ 3 , but we have less informa-
tion about the value of  σ 2 , which concerns a single service. The results are, however, 
robust to reasonable variations of this parameter. Holding  σ 3 = 2.3 and reducing the 
value of  σ 2 from 2.3 to 0 reduces the share of sector 2 from 15.5 percent to 11.3 per-
cent, with a corresponding increase in the share of sector 1, and virtually no change in 
the share of sector 3. But even at  σ 2 close to 1, the share of sector 2 is 13 percent, that 
of sector 1 is 66 percent, and that of sector 3 is 21 percent. So the model is robust to 
reasonable variations in the elasticity of substitution between home and market care.
The main contribution of this example was to show that in order to reconcile the 
small country differences in the share of sector 1, with the large differences in the 
shares of the other two sectors, the model requires a low ε elasticity and a high  σ j 
elasticity, especially for sector 3. Both of these are consistent with the empirical 
estimates of these elasticities.
V.  Substitutions across Market Goods as an Explanation for Country Differences
In this section, we show that when the home-production substitution is shut 
down, e.g., by evaluating the model solutions at  ψ j = 1, the taxes and subsidies that 
we have computed push country hours distributions in the “right” direction, but they 
are not large enough to explain the large differences in actual distributions, given 
the small ε. Moreover, if we allow ε to take larger values, the explanatory power of 
this channel improves, but it fails to predict the unbalanced responses of the three 
sectors to the tax differentials.
For  ψ j = 1, equations (16) and (17) yield
(18)   l j  _ 
 l 1 
= (  ω j  _  ω 1 )ε (  A j  _  A 1 )−(1−ε) ( 1 +  t j  _1 +  t 1  )−ε .
For sector 2,  t 2 <  t 1 in all countries in the sample, but for sector 3,  t 3 =  t 1 . Taxes 
therefore cannot predict differences in the ratio  l 3 / l 1 without the market-home 
substitution, but they could predict differences in the ratio  l 2 / l 1 . These differences 
imply differences in market shares, which we compare with the data that we 
described in section 2. In deviations from log means, we obtain, for each country in 
the sample,
(19) ln   l 2i  _
 l 1i 
 −  E j ln   l 2j  _ l 1j  = − ε (ln  1 +  t 2i  _1 +  t 1i  −  E j ln  1 +  t 2j  _1 +  t 1j  ),
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where i and j are country identifiers, and E in front of the log denotes the sample 
mean. We use (19) to obtain a prediction for the ratio  l 2 / l 1 for each country.
The predictions for ε = 0.3, which we consider to be at the upper end of the most 
reasonable values at this level of aggregation, have a good correlation with the data, 
but do not have enough variation. The simple correlation coefficient between the 
prediction obtained from (19) and the data for the 19 countries is 0.86. The standard 
deviation of the data, however, is seven times as big as the standard deviation of the 
prediction. The conclusion that can be reached from this is that the impact of taxes 
and subsidies on the relative size of sector 2 is significant and in the right direction. 
But the quantitative impact of the calculated tax rates when only market substitu-


































































Figure 3B. Predicted Impact of Taxation, Share of Health and Social Care Sector, ε 1.5
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We show in Figure 3A the predictions for market shares obtained from (19). 
Applying the methodology of (19) to sector 3 as well gives, as a prediction, the 
sample means, because there are no tax differences between sectors 1 and 3. Using 
the two predictions in (8), we obtain a prediction for the share of market hours in 
sector 2, shown in Figure 3A. The lines drawn in this figure are the 45° line and lines 
for the sample means of the data and prediction, which are the same by construction. 
An “ideal” prediction would have all the points lying along the 45° line, whereas, if 
taxes had no explanatory power, all points would be on the sample mean line. There 
is clearly predictive power to the model, but the predictions are a long way from the 
ideal ones. The mean absolute distance of the predictions from the 45° line is 2.68, 
compared with the distance of the means of 3.02.
The predictions in Figure 3A were derived with the tax rate obtained when only 
social work subsidies are taken into account. The predictions with the broader mea-
sure of subsidies that includes also half of health spending by the government are 
very similar and not reported. The correlation coefficient between the prediction for 
l 2 / l 1 with the data is 0.81, but the standard deviation of the data is 5.2 times as large 
as the standard deviation of the prediction.
The substitution margin that drives the results in Figure 3A is across market sec-
tors only. It predicts that as health and social care are subsidized, and the other 
sectors taxed, consumers switch their consumption from the other market goods 
to health and social care. Our finding is that such a switch takes place, but because 
health and social care are not sufficiently close substitutes to other market goods 
there cannot be large substitutions, even when there are large subsidies to health and 
social care. It is natural to conclude from this that had there been more substitution 
possibilities, the model would have performed better. A log-linear regression esti-
mate of (19) gives ε = 1.7 for the whole sample and ε = 1.4 when Korea (which 
is an outlier) is excluded from the estimation, with a large increase in  r 2 . The best 
fitting line to the share data is between these two, at about 1.5. Figure 3B shows the 
predicted series for the share of sector 2 for ε = 1.5. A regression line through the 
points virtually coincides with the 45° line, and gives a good fit ( r 2 = 0.72), which 
shows that the best-fitting specification explains a large part of the variation in the 
employment share of health and social work. The absolute mean deviation of these 
predictions from the 45° line (including Korea) is 1.76, only 58 percent of the dis-
tance of the data points from the sample mean. However, the caveat remains that the 
value of the elasticity required to give this fit is far off the range of plausible values.
One might still ask if a simpler model that ignores home production, combined 
with a high value for ε, is a useful shortcut that might explain the data. The answer 
is that at least for the allocation of work time across sectors, it is not. If the simpler 
model were used as an approximation, the response of the other two sectors to the 
health and social work subsidies should be similar, and this goes against the evidence 
shown in Figure 1. There is more variation in the share of sector 3, and its share is 
better correlated with the share of sector 2, than is the share of sector 1. The implied 
share of sector 3 for ε = 1.5 improves the prediction of the sector 3 share over the 
mean, but only marginally. The absolute deviation of the data from the sample mean 
for sector 3 is 2.84; for ε = 0.3, it is 2.79; and for the best fitting ε = 1.5, it is 2.43. 
So although a high ε is a useful shortcut as an explanation of the differences in the 
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share of sector 2 in terms of taxes and subsidies, it implies too large a response of 
sector 1 hours and too small a response of sector 3 hours.
VI. Substitutions between Market and Home Production
When we allow for the substitution between market and home goods, our model 
can explain with conventional parameters both the bigger impact of policy on the 
hours distribution across countries and the asymmetric response of sectors 1 and 
3. We first investigate the impact of home production on the hours distribution 
conditional on observed home production. By doing this, we are allowing for the 
differences in home production that are not due to policy to also influence the cross-
market distributions. Following this, we investigate the impact of policy on home 
production differences across countries.
Formally, in this section, we are fixing the marketization of time  l j / l jh for sectors 
2 and 3 at the observed values in all countries, and derive the optimal allocations 
across the three market sectors, conditional on the observed marketizations. By fix-
ing the marketization of time, we are effectively also fixing the marketization of 
consumption, so the question that we are investigating in this section is whether 
equation (16) does a good job predicting the employment shares, given the observed 
values for the tax ratios and the marketization ratios. The only difficulty with this 
prediction is that the marketization of consumption is not observed, so we need to 
replace it with a term that has the observed marketization of time in its place.
Making use of the production functions for market and home goods to obtain an 
expression for  c j / ˜  cj in terms of the marketization of time, and substituting into (16), 
yields
(20)  ln   l j  _ 
 l 1 
=  ε ln   ω j  _  ω 1 +  
 σ j (1 − ε) _
 σ j − 1  ln  ψ j − (1 − ε) ln  
 A 1  _
 A j 
 
  − ε ln ( 1 +  t j  _1 +  t 1  ) −   σ j − ε _ σ j − 1  ln (1 +  x j (  l j  _  l jh  ) −( σ j −1)/ σ j  ), 
where  x j ≡ (1/ ψ j − 1) ( A j / A jh ) − (σ j −1)/ σ j  is a function of preference and productivity 
parameters. Taking a log-linear approximation to the last term of (20) about the 
sample mean, we obtain
(21)      ln (1 +  x j (  l j  _  l jh  ) −( σ j −1)/ σ j  )
  =  ln  (1 +  x j  e  _ z j  ) +   x j  e 
 
_ z j  
 _ 
1 +  x j  e  _ z j    
 σ j − 1 _ σ j   (ln (  l j  _  l jh  ) − E ln(  l j  _  l jh  )), 
where  
_ z j is the sample mean of  z j = − ( ( σ j − 1) / σ j ) ln  ( l j / l jh ) .
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As before, we use the model to make predictions of the allocations across coun-
tries in deviations from sample means. Combining (20) and (21), we obtain
(22)  ln   l ji  _ 
 l 1i 
−  E k ln   l jk  _  l 1k = − ε (ln  1 +  t ji  _1 +  t 1i  −  E k ln  1 +  t jk  _1 +  t 1k  )
 +   x j  e 
 
_ z j  
 _ 
1 +  x j  e  _ z j    
 σ j − ε _ σ j   (ln (  l ji  _  l jhi  ) −  E k ln (  l jk  _  l jhk  ),
where i and k are country identifiers; and j is the sector identifier, taking the values 
2 or 3.
For sector 2, each country’s deviation from the sample mean is the sum of two 
terms. The expenditure tax terms that were computed before from (19), and a  second 
term that is due to home production. For sector 3, the only term in the prediction is 
the home production term in (22), as there are no tax distortions between sectors 1 
and 3 and  t 3 =  t 1 .
The coefficient  x j  e 
 
_ z j  /(1 +  x j  e  _ z j  ) is a number between 0 and 1, but we have no 
information about it being a combination of preference and technology parameters 
over market and home consumption. If this coefficient were zero, home production 
would play no role in the allocation of market work, so it is obviously important for 
our results. However, it turns out that the results are robust to a large range of values 
for this coefficient, once it exceeds a low value such as 0.2. We adopted the follow-
ing approach to finding a value for it.  
_ z j can be calculated directly from the data on 
home and market production. To get a value for  x j , we assume that the productivity 
ratio  A j / A jh is 1 in both sectors, as these are low-skill services, and that the prefer-
ence ratio (1 −  ψ j )/ ψ j is equal to the average ratio of home-to-market production. 
These targets hold exactly for  σ j = 1, but we do not impose this restriction on  σ j in 
any of the other calculations. The outcome for each sector is,17
(23)   x 2  e  
_ z 2  
 _ 
1 +  x 2  e  _ z 2    
 σ 2 − ε _ σ 2   = 0.64
(24)   x 3  e  
_ z 3  
 _ 
1 +  x 3  e  _ z 3    
 σ 3 − ε _ σ 3   =  0.80.
The predictions for the ratios  l 2 / l 1 and  l 3 / l 1 , when the values in (23) and (24) are 
used, are now much closer to the data than they were without the home production 
terms. For sector 2, the standard deviation of the data series is only 1.33 times the 
standard deviation of the predicted series, and the correlation between the two series 
is 0.89. Moreover, these predictions are virtually identical to the ones for a lower  σ 2 . 
17 A log-linear regression estimate of (22) over the cross-section of 19 countries gives the following estimates 
for this coefficient: 0.67 for sector 2, with p value 0.0003; and 0.34 for sector 3, with p value 0.0007. The regression 
for sector 2 also gives an estimate for ε, but still one that we would regard to be too high, 0.77, with p value 0.03.
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For  σ 2 = 1.5, the ratio between the standard deviation of the data to the prediction 
is 1.49, and the correlation between the two series remains at 0.89. For sector 3, the 
standard deviation of the data is only 0.44 times the standard deviation of the pre-
diction, with correlation 0.55, but this is largely due to Korea, which is an outlier. If 
Korea is omitted from the sample, the ratio of the standard deviations becomes 0.62, 
and their correlation coefficient is also 0.62.
We now use these predictions, including Korea, to derive predictions for the sec-
tor market shares. These are shown in Figures 4A and 4B for  σ 2 =  σ 3 = 2.3.18 The 
18 The online Appendix reports predictions for lower values of σ. They are virtually indistinguishable from the 































































Figure 4B. Predicted Sector 3 Share, Home Production Exogenous
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model fits the data well for both sectors, except for the Korea outlier in sector 3. As 
before, the three lines are the 45° line and the lines for the sample means. The model 
picks up well the Scandinavian group of countries in both sectors, as well as the 
smaller deviations across the other countries. The large majority of countries, and 
all the ones with large deviations from the sample mean, are pushed toward the 45° 
line by the model. The average absolute difference between the data and the predic-
tion for sector 2 is 1.45, compared with the deviation between data and sample mean 
of 3.02. In sector 3, the model is also pushing the vast majority of countries toward 
the 45° line, but the averages are distorted because of the Korea outlier. The average 
absolute deviation between data and prediction is 3.14, compared with the average 
distance between data and sample mean of 2.84. But when Korea is omitted, the 
model’s average distance from the data goes down to 2.64.19
VII. Can Taxes and Subsidies Explain Marketization?
We conclude that a combination of symmetric cross-market substitutions with 
asymmetric market-home substitutions explains the observed differences in the 
distribution of hours of work. But can taxes explain the cross-country differences 
in the marketization of time? The key marketization equation of the model is 
(15), which makes the marketization of time a log-linear function of preference 
parameters, productivity parameters and the tax wedge. As in previous sections, 
we assume that preferences and productivities are common across the countries 
of the sample and investigate the extent to which differences in the tax wedge can 
explain the observed differences in the marketization of time. Figures 5A and 5B 
show the results with the elasticities of substitution previously used, 2.3 in both 
sectors.20 The model picks up well the difference between the Scandinavian coun-
tries and the rest of the sample in the marketization of family care, but there are 
clearly other influences on the marketization of care.21 The correlation between 
data and prediction with  σ 2 = 2.3 is 0.645. Results are virtually identical for a 
lower elasticity of substitution. For  σ 2 = 1.5, the correlation improves slightly to 
0.654, but the graph of the predictions against the data is indistinguishable from 
Figure 5A. Similarly, when the broader subsidy that includes health is included, 
the results are also very similar to the ones shown in Figure 5A. The correlation 
between data and predictions for the broader measure is 0.60 for  σ 2 = 2.3 and 
rises to 0.63 for  σ 2 = 1.5.
19 The problem with Korea is that it has an extremely high marketization ratio in sector 3. The model then pre-
dicts extremely high market share for this sector, but in the data it is not as high because market hours are also very 
high for sector 1. None of the papers that attempt to predict differences in market hours across countries with taxes 
include Korea in their sample. The extremely high number of aggregate market hours in that country would defy 
any prediction based on policy.
20 Simple log-linear regressions of equation (15) with the 19 observations for sectors 2 and 3 give 
 σ 2 = 1.3 ( p = 0.057) and  σ 3 = 2.2 ( p = 0.0005), respectively. This ranking is consistent with our discussion in 
Section III. Moreover, as we have already argued, the predictions of the share of sector 2 with an elasticity like the 
estimated one are virtually indistinguishable from the predictions with  σ 2 = 2.3.
21 Several writers have written about the differences in the way that OECD citizens view the role of social care 
and family-related work in the home and the market, so differences in tastes may play a role here. See for example, 
Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999), and Yann Algan and Pierre Cahuc (2009).
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In contrast, the marketization of other services is explained well by the different 
tax rates, with the exception of Korea, which is an outlier because of its extremely 
high market hours in sector 3. But even with Korea included in the predictions, the 


























































Figure 5B. Actual and Predicted Marketization in Other Services
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VIII. Conclusions
We summarize the main findings as showing that the large differences in the 
allocation of market work across the countries of the OECD can be attributed to the 
differences in taxation, the subsidization of social work, and the market-home pro-
duction substitution. Taxes and subsidies cause substitutions along two dimensions, 
across market goods because of different tax rates applying to different goods, and 
between market and home production because home production is neither taxed nor 
subsidized. The interaction between these two margins explains both the quantita-
tive impact of policy and the asymmetric response of different sectors to the taxes 
and subsidies; in particular, the fact that the main differences in the allocation of 
hours of work across countries are in health and social work and in unskilled ser-
vices. The market-home production substitution is the key explanation to the asym-
metric response because of the different substitution possibilities between market 
and home work across goods and services.
We demonstrated these claims by making use of data on taxes and social expen-
diture from the OECD, home production data from time use surveys, and disag-
gregated data on hours of work by sector. We were able to do this for 19 OECD 
countries with favorable results.
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